Although violence has declined significantly in recent years, foreign fighters and ideologues continue to reference “jihad” in Chechnya and many Russian-speaking fighters in Syria have previous experience of the North Caucasus conflict. In this article, Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman outline the evolution of those conflicts.
The contemporary North Caucasus insurgency has its origins in the First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-1996 and 1999-2002 respectively). The ideology of the leadership of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) during the first war was predominantly nationalist-separatist, with Islam playing only a subsidiary, instrumental role. Within the separatist movement, however, a loose Islamist camp took shape, consisting of Chechen radicals such as Movladi Udugov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev; salafis from across the North Caucasus, like the Dagestani Bagautdin Kebedov; and foreign ideologues and fighters who arrived in the region from 1993 onwards, the most famous of which was Ibn Khattab (Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem). Initially peripheral, its candidates were soundly defeated in the 1997 presidential election, which was won by the moderate Aslan Maskhadov, architect of Chechen victory in the first war. However, this grouping rose to prominence in the interwar period. Their appeal was boosted by financial patronage from abroad and the simplicity of their message. They repeatedly challenged Maskhadov’s authority in the run-up to the second war and it was one such challenge, the incursion into Dagestan by Khattab and his influential local ally, Shamil Basayev, that led to that war in October 1999.
The influence of foreign fighters, such as Ibn Khattab, peaked in the interwar years and declined as a result of tensions over agendas, targeted assassinations by the Russian security services, and international pressure on radical Islamist financing in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks. However, by this point the Islamist influence on the insurgency was well-established. Maskhadov himself vacillated between appeasing and suppressing the Islamists, leading people to draw markedly different conclusions about both his and the insurgency’s ideological orientation. Some viewed the insurgency as, to all intents and purposes, an unofficial al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliate, pointing to AQ propaganda promoting the Chechen conflict; the involvement of Arab fighters in the conflict and personal ties between AQ personnel and fighters based in the North Caucasus.
The reality, however, was far more complex. Maskhadov represented the moderate wing of the insurgency, and he sought a political resolution to the conflict through negotiations with Russia and international mediators.[1] The “duality” he displayed appeared to stem largely from his efforts to “find a common language with different segments of the resistance”[2] and maintain a united front against Russia. Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, had a clear incentive to associate itself with the North Caucasus insurgency, which fitted with its broader strategy of piggybacking on conflicts with different agendas to attract recruits.[3]
Maskhadov represented the moderate wing of the insurgency, and he sought a political resolution to the conflict through negotiations with Russia and international mediators.
Furthermore, only a small number of AQ personnel had links to the Caucasus, and such links mostly predated AQ’s significant activity. [4] For example, Khattab was a rival to, rather than a subordinate of, AQ leader Osama bin Laden and pursued his own agenda.[5] Indeed, the links to AQ were at least in part a self-fulfilling prophesy stemming from Russian and US portrayals of the conflict, which sought to link it to the war against international terrorism. Just as importantly, such links as did exist were predominantly through the informal networks of individuals like Basayev, and the Islamists represented only one wing of the insurgency – even after the defection to the Russian side of key Sufi figures such as Chechen Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov and the influential Yamadayev family.
Maskhadov’s position and his efforts to resist the Islamist influence were ultimately weakened by a lack of external support and the loss of many allies, limiting his ability to control the radical factions. His successor as ChRI president, Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, formalised the regionalisation of the conflict by establishing the Caucasus Front.[6] Although Sadulayev’s tenure as leader was short, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn about his ideology and intentions, Maskhadov’s former Foreign Minister, Ilyas Akhmadov, has argued that Sadulayev was probably laying the groundwork for the proclamation of the Imarat Kavkaz (IK).[7] Instead, it was his successor, Dokka Umarov, who took that step.
The Establishment of the Caucasus Emirate
In October 2007, Umarov announced the abolition of the ChRI and the establishment of the IK. According to Umarov, this new “emirate” consisted not of the republics of the North Caucasus, but of wilayah (provinces). Russia and its local allies were recast as “infidels” and “apostates,” instead of “occupiers” and “collaborators” – employing language already well established within sectors of the insurgency. The proclamation was a watershed moment for the North Caucasus insurgency, causing a final rupture between the Islamist camp and the pro-Western faction led by Akhmed Zakayev. Yet several details warrant particular consideration.
Firstly, although precise authorship of the proclamation is unclear, it did not originate with Umarov: Akhmadov saw the proclamation as a “foreign innovation” drafted by Movladi Udugov, erstwhile militant propagandist and former ChRI First Deputy Prime Minister;[8] non-Chechen ideologists like Kabardino-Balkarian rebel leader Anzor Astemirov also played a key role, as acknowledged by Umarov himself, who cited pressure from Astemirov and claimed the proclamation was based on Basayev’s papers. Indeed, Umarov enjoyed stronger credentials as a military than ideological leader and his statements as ChRI president had not advanced an Islamist agenda; instead, he had framed the conflict as a regional anti-colonial resistance. Although he characterised the conflict as jihad and relied on religion to motivate supporters, in doing so he followed a path well trodden by previous leaders seeking regional support for a variety of goals. His early statements left no doubt that he considered Russia to be the main enemy. The West featured as a source of disappointment for its failure to support Chechen independence, rather than as an enemy to be targeted.[9] Even after the proclamation, the transformation in how Umarov framed the conflict was much more gradual than that manifested in the language of the proclamation itself.[10]
The West featured as a source of disappointment for its failure to support Chechen independence, rather than as an enemy to be targeted.
Secondly, there exists not one but two versions of the proclamation, and the two contain an important difference. The first was released by the Zakayev faction, while the second, “official” version released in November 2007 redacted “America, England, Israel” as specified enemies from the text. Although the implication is identical, a decision was made to avoid explicitly mentioning these countries. On the one hand, their original inclusion points to there being support within the insurgency for a more explicitly anti-Western agenda. On the other hand, their removal suggests such support was not universal.
Finally, the ideological tensions within the insurgency and its expatriate support community did not disappear with the break with the Zakayev faction. Over time, Umarov devoted considerable effort to defending the decision to proclaim the IK and discrediting its opponents. As late as August 2013, Umarov was still responding to questions from expatriates about the proclamation, demonstrating its controversial nature. All of these points highlight the importance of considering ideological variation within the insurgency and not viewing it as a monolithic entity. Traces of the ideas found in the proclamation and the tensions that existed over them can be found in earlier material produced by groups within the insurgency. Sometimes, as with Umarov, the positions of actors appeared to change; more often, ideological shifts can be traced to changes in the relative influence of groups within the insurgency.
Conclusion
This explainer has offered a general introduction to the geographical and ideological evolution of the conflicts in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus region. It has illustrated the significance of the conflicts, but also the contested nature of many of the claims about its ideological evolution. Understanding these conflicts remains important given that they continue to serve as reference points for both foreign jihadists and ideologues, and many Russian-speaking fighters in Syria – including several senior leaders – have experience of them. In the next explainer, we will focus on more recent developments in the North Caucasus and the role of the IK.
Further Reading:
Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff, Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy: Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
http://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137338785
Ilyas Akhmadov with Miriam Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780230105348
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Thomas Hegghammer, “‘Classical’ and ‘Global’ Jihadism in Saudi Arabia,” in Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:5 (2008) 412-433.
Cerwyn Moore, ‘Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom’, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:9 (2012) 1780-1807.
Mark Youngman, ‘Broader, vaguer, weaker: The Evolving Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate Leadership’, Terrorism and Political Violence,
[1] Ilyas Akhmadov and Nicholas Daniloff, Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy: Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
[2] Ilyas Akhmadov with Miriam Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 237.
[3] Thomas Hegghammer, “‘Classical’ and ‘Global’ Jihadism in Saudi Arabia,” in Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 219.
[4] Moore and Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya.”
[5] See also Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (2nd Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 57-58.
[6] Moore and Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya,” Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31:5 (2008) 426.
[7] Akhmadov with Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle, 233.
[8] Akhmadov with Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle, 244.
[9] Mark Youngman, ‘Broader, vaguer, weaker: The Evolving Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate Leadership’, Terrorism and Political Violence.
[10] Mark Youngman, ‘Broader, vaguer, weaker: The Evolving Ideology of the Caucasus Emirate Leadership’, Terrorism and Political Violence.